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[Prof. Hafemeister’s manuscript was prepared on March 22, 2011, just eleven days after the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. The situ-
ation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant will no doubt evolve rapidly over the coming weeks. For readers wishing to keep 
up with the latest developments, updates on the situation in Japan prepared by the MIT department of Nuclear Science and Engineering 
are available at http://mitnse.com/. Information on safety and oversight at US nuclear plants in 2010 is given in a Union of Concerned 
Scientists (UCS) website at http://ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear_power_risk/safety/nrc-and-nuclear-power-2010.html?utm_&utm_
medium=Lochbaum&utm_campaign=SP-Lochbaum-3-17-11. Another UCS website, http://allthingsnuclear.org/tagged/Japan_nuclear, 
has successive news stories and helpful graphics, as well as links to other useful sites – Ed.] 
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake from a “reverse fault” struck northeastern Japan. The Fuku-
aVW[O 6OWWQVW aWbS ]\ bVS BOQWsQ AQSO\! ')% Y[ \]`bV"SOab 
of Tokyo, houses six boiling water reactors, three of which 
were in operation and three in maintenance at the time of the 
earthquake. It appears that the three-operating reactors shut 
down without a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), but the ac-
companying tsunami, which arrived 15 minutes later, disabled 
back-up electrical generators. This prevented pumping of 
cooling water to the reactors and their spent fuel ponds. The 
ensuing damage and radioactive release is the worst accident 
since the Chernobyl accident in Ukraine on 26April 1986. The 
Chernobyl accident was particularly bad since the burning of 
its carbon moderator propelled 3-4% of the radioactive core 
into the atmosphere from a reactor without a containment 
dome. The radioactive releases from the Fukushima site will, 
most likely, be far less than was the case Chernobyl, but the 
clean-up of the Fukushima reactors and spent fuel ponds will 
PS dS`g  aWU\WsQO\b# FVS FV`SS ?WZS  ;aZO\R 3QQWRS\b ]T ', 
March 1979 released only minor amounts of radioactivity, 
but the cleanup cost $1 billion and took eight years. 
In this article, I use some basic reactor and thermal 
physics to estimate the available response time before a light 
water reactor core begins to melt. I consider two types of 
accidents: A loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a loss of 
power accident (LOPA). The calculated response time for a 
LOCA is about 1 minute, and, for a LOPA, about 0.5-1 day, 
but individual circumstances cause variations on these results. 
These calculations are based on material presented in Ref. 1. 
Helicopters and water cannons failed to cool the reac-
tors and the spent fuel ponds. As a last-gasp effort, corrosive 
aSOeObS` eWbV P]`WQ OQWR eOa t]]RSR ]\ `SOQb]`a &! ' O\R (! 
but without the use of their internal pumps. It is speculated 
that rapid deployment of portable generators on land or ships 
to give power to the reactors’ pumps could have lessened the 
severity of the Fukushima accident. First, I will summarize 
the status, one week after the earthquake-tsunami of March 
11, of the six Fukushima Daiichi (FD) reactors and spent fuel 
ponds [2]: 
FD-1: Hydrogen from oxidation of zircaloy cladding (over 
95% zirconium) exploded on March 12, destroying the sec-
]\RO`g Q]\s\S[S\b `]]T! Pcb bVS ^`W[O`g Q]\bOW\[S\b eOa 
said to be intact. 
FD-2: Hydrogen explosion on March 15 breached primary 
containment, causing a partial meltdown. Iodine-131 (8-day 
half-life) was observed in Tokyo at a distance of 240 km on 
March 19 and its level in spinach at a distance of 70 km was 
27 times the limited level. On March 20, electrical power was 
reestablish at unit 2, with the other units to follow. Water was 
added to the pond 2 on March 20. 
FD-3: Hydrogen explosion on March 14 destroyed the 
aSQ]\RO`g Q]\s\S[S\b `]]T O\R eOZZa# B]\R ( eOa sZZSR ]\ 
March 20. 
FD-4: Reactor was shut down three months ago with the 
transfer of all of its spent fuel to the spent fuel pond. Full-core 
discharges are rarely done in the U.S., where only the oldest 
fuel is usually removed. The young, very hot spent fuel heated 
pond water to boiling, with a report that pond had no water, 
abO`bW\U O s`S# FVWa Wa Q]\aWabS\b eWbV bVS ZOab"[SOac`SR bS[-
perature of 84oC (183oF), as compared to the usual temperature 
of 25oC (77o8 # B]\R ) eOa sZZSR ]\ ?O`QV '%# 
FD-5: Reactor was shut down, but the pool’s last-measured 
temperature was 63oC (145oF), as compared to the usual 
temperature of 25oC (77oF). 
FD-6: Reactor was shut down, but the pool’s last measured 
temperature was 60oC (140oF), as compared to the usual 
temperature of 25oC (77oF). 
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Loss-of-Coolant Rise Time 
  ; s`ab QOZQcZObS bVS bVS`[OZ `WaS bW[S ]T O ZWUVb eObS` `S-
actor (LWR) core after a loss-of-coolant accident. Thermal 
`WaS Wa bVS bW[S T]` bVS Q]`S b] USb acTsQWS\bZg V]b b] PSUW\ O\ 
exothermal reaction between zircaloy and water. The calcula-
tion is based on the following assumptions [1]: 
l 	\ 7[S`US\Qg Q]`S"Q]]ZO\b eObS`  755E  eObS` R]Sa \]b 
arrive until fuel rods are over 1370°C, when zircaloy 
cladding and water exothermically release hydrogen. This 
happens below its melting point of 2200°C. 
l 	\ 5]`S [Oaa Wa &%* YU GA2 for 1 GWe reactor. [Fukushima 
reactor #1 is rated at 460 MWe, reactors 2-5 at 784 GWe, 
and reactor 6 at 1.1 GWe]. 
l  >ID bVS`[OZ STsQWS\Qg Wa   = 1/3. 
l  3dS`OUS TcSZ bS[^S`Obc`S Wa )%%k5 PST]`S O >A53# 
l  FVS`[OZ ^ ]eS` T`][ PSbO RSQOg OTbS` >A53 Bo = 3 GWt): 
P = P (0.0766t-0.181) 0 < t < 150 sec, (1)
P = P
o
o(0.130t-0.283) 150 sec < t < 4 x l06 sec. (2) 
These equations give 7.7% of operating thermal power at 1 
second, 3.7% at 1 minute, 1.3% at 1 hour, 0.5% at 1 day, 0.3% 
at 1 week, and 0.2% at one month, all of which conform to 
the measured data. 
The thermal rise time is obtained by equating the heat needed 
to raise the core to 1370oC to the time integral of thermal 
power P. The heat needed to raise the core to 1370oC is 
Q = Nc(T),	 (3) 
where N is the number of moles of UO2, c is the UO2 molar 
a^SQWsQ VSOb! O\R T is the temperature rise for the core to be 
1370°C, that is, T = 1370°C – 400°C = 970°C. The number 
of moles of UO2 in the core is 
N = (108 g)/(238 + 32)g/mole = 3.7 x 105 moles. (4) 
FVS VWUV"bS[^S`Obc`S a^SQWsQ VSOb! c = 3R = 24.9 J/mole-°C, 
is used since the temperatures are considerably above the UO2
Debye temperature of 100 K. Thus, the heat needed to raise 
the core to its critical temperature is 
Qrise = Nc(T) = (3.7 x 105 moles)(24.9 J/mole-°C)
(970°C) = 8.9 x 109 J. (5) 
The thermal rise time is obtained by equating Qrise, to the time 
integral of the beta decay power, 
t t 
0 0Qbeta decay = J P dt = J 0.0766(3 x 109)t-0.181dt = 
(2.8 x 108)t0.819 J = 8.9 x 109 J.	  (6) 
Solving for t gives a thermal rise time of 68 sec, which is 
close to the published values of 1 minute, calculated with the 
heat equation [3]. Since the time scale for a LOCA is only a 
minute, essentially all beta-decay heat is trapped in the core. 
Loss-of-Power Rise Time 
A more gradual LOCA almost happened in 1975 when a 
workman at the Brown’s Ferry,Alabama, boiling water reactor 
4ID  caSR O QO\RZS b] QVSQY OW`t]e O\R W\ORdS`bS\bZg aSb 
s`S b] SZSQb`WQOZ QOPZSa! QcbbW\U ]TT SZSQb`WQOZ ^ ]eS` T]` Q]]ZW\U 
pumps. Beta-decay heat began evaporating the water coolant, 
which in turn initiated a process that would have uncovered 
the core and begun a LOCA. The beta-decay heat needed to 
evaporate 700 tonnes of water is 
Q  = mL  = (7 x 105 kg)(2.27 MJ/kg) =evap evap
1.6 x 1012 J.	 (7) 
Setting Qevap equal to the integrated beta-decay heat, over the 
two time regions, gives t = 19 hours, similar to the stated 13 
hours available to recover the situation. 
LOCA in Spent Fuel Ponds 
The Fukushima spent fuel ponds are 12 meters deep, with 
8 meters of water over the tops of the spent fuel assemblies. 
Pond water can be lost through holes in the concrete and by 
evaporation from the radioactive heat of the spent fuel. After 
one year, spent fuel radioactive heating is 15 kW/tonne, and 
at 10 years it falls to 2 kW/tonne. The spent fuel problem was 
exacerbated in the United States because the density of spent 
fuel in the ponds was increased as a result of the 1977 deci-
sion not to reprocess spent fuel. Increasing the density of fuel 
rods gives additional heating density and reduces the paths to 
remove heat by radiation and convection. Some parameters 
give can temperatures over 900oC in a spent fuel pond after 
a LOCA, a point where zircaloy cladding spontaneously 
ignites in air [4]. The problem could be lessened by moving 
some rods to a geological repository, or by placing them in 
surface storage, which is happening in the U.S. at this time. 
Damage could be mitigated after loss of coolant in the ponds 
by plugging pond holes with quick-setting material, pouring 
water on the ponds, or using large air blowers. 
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A Final Comment 
Further data and analysis by experts are needed before 
serious conclusions on the Fukushima accident can be made. 
However, it initially seems that rapid deployment of portable 
generators on trucks or on ships to the Fukushima site could 
have made a considerable difference. Cables would be needed 
to deliver the power, but this should have been possible. Crews 
would experience some radiation, but less than that received 
Pg bVS sTbg e]`YS`a W\aWRS bVS ^ZO\ba# FVSaS US\S`Ob]`a Q]cZR 
have provided electricity to drive the internal pumps at the reac-
tors to bring water into the reactors and the spent fuel ponds. 
It took nine days to establish a 1.5 km power line to reactor 2 
on March 20, with power to follow at the other reactors. 
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Where is North Korea’s Nuclear Program Heading? 
Siegfried S. Hecker 
[This article is an edited version of a report prepared by Dr. Hecker soon after his return from North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex 
in November, 2010; we are grateful for his permission to run it. A related article appeared as a “Back Page” in APS News (March, 2011)]. 
Dr. Hecker’s full article and related reports can be found at his website, http://cisac.stanford.edu/people/siegfriedshecker/. Dr. Hecker 
is a Professor (Research) of Management Science and Engineering, a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International 
Studies, and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, all at Stanford University. Trained as a metallur-
gist, he is regarded as one of the leading experts in the world on the properties of plutonium, and served as Director of the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory from 1986-1997 - Ed.] 
On November 12, 2010, John W. Lewis, Robert Carlin and ]T Bg]\UgO\U# 6c`W\U [g s`ab dWaWb W\ <O\cO`g '%%) ; eOa I visited North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex. shown a sample of plutonium metal that had been reprocessed 
There we were shown a 25 to 30 megawatt-electric (MWe) from spent fuel rods that had been stored since 1994 as part 
experimental light-water reactor (LWR) in the early stages of the Agreed Framework, and which was subsequently used 
of construction, along with a modern uranium enrichment Oa P][P TcSZ T]` @]`bV =]`SOra s`ab \cQZSO` bSab ]T '%%+ L&M# 
TOQWZWbg# FVWa `SOQb]` Wa @]`bV =]`SOra s`ab ObbS[^b Ob >ID  During all of my previous trips to North Korea, government
technology. These facilities appear to be designed primarily ]TsQWOZa O\R bSQV\WQOZ a^SQWOZWaba RS\WSR bVS SfWabS\QS ]T O\g 
for civilian nuclear power as opposed to boosting North Ko- uranium enrichment activities. Following their 2009 rocket 
rea’s military nuclear capability. launch and second nuclear test, Pyongyang expelled the U.S. 
This visit allowed us to answer some questions about technical team and international inspectors and declared that 
Pyongyang’s nuclear directions, but it also raised many more. it would build its own light-water reactor (LWR) and produce 
In this article I describe our visit and offer some comments its own fuel. For this visit, I asked to see the key nuclear 
on how the response of the United States and its partners to sites in order to judge their current status and to see if the 
these developments may help to shape whether Pyongyang enrichment technology that they announced at that time was 
will rely more on bomb development for diplomatic leverage successful [2]. Our visit was supported by a number of foun-
or begin a shift toward nuclear electricity, which it desires dations, including the Ploughshares Foundation, the Carnegie 
both for economic and symbolic reasons. Corporation, and the MacArthur Foundation. 
We were met by a small technical team and representa-
tives of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy. The senior #-,(%2-,  1&+'$. "&*',0*3& !'/'$.&) ',0'. bSQV\WQOZ  ]TsQWOZ  UOdS  bVS  T]ZZ]eW\U  W\b`]RcQbW]\.  p;\  bVS This trip was my seventh to North Korea and my fourth 1980s and 1990s, we agreed to give up our reactors for LWRs, to the Yongbyon complex, which is located about 90 km north 2,000 Megawatt-electric (MWe) by 2003. In the early 1990s 
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